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Little Known Canadian Units 
The Corps of Guides, 
1903-1914 
Dan R. Jenkins 
'T"he Canadian Corps of Guides was created in 
~ April 1903 by General Order 61 , and fell 
under the purview of the Intelligence Department 
at Militia Headquarters in Ottawa. However, as 
the Guides were a service of the Active Militia, 
and not of the Permanent Force, they were not a 
full-time formation. The Corps was designed to 
fulfil both a peacetime and wartime role. During 
active operations it was to act as a combat 
intelligence force for Canadian armies in the field, 
and provide commanders with operational and 
tactical level intelligence. During peacetime it was 
to prepare for this eventuality, but more 
importantly, it was to help accumulate intelligence 
on Canada's military resources and capabilities, 
as well as on those offoreign powers, in particular 
the United States. As with all of Canada's 
peacetime military establishments, the Guides 
suffered from underfunding, understaffing and 
undertraining. Nevertheless, the Corps of Guides 
was still able to provide a valuable service in the 
years leading up to the First World War, and 
offered its members a background in Intelligence 
that would prove indispensable in that war. 1 
Canada's experience in the Boer War had 
much to do with the creation of the Corps of 
Guides. In the South Afrtcan War, Canadians saw 
first-hand the value of Scouts and scouting. Many, 
including General Dundonald, the General Officer 
Commanding the Canadian Militia, believed that 
a mounted scouting force would prove valuable 
in Canada, a country similar to SouthMrica, with 
wide open and sparsely populated spaces. As the 
1904 Militia Report stated: 
Valuable as such a corps proved in Natal during 
the South African war, its value to a country such 
as Canada can hardly be over-estimated. It not 
only forms an indispensable adjunct to an 
Intelligence Department, but it enables Canada 
to be covered by a network of capable officers, 
trained durtng peace in their special duties, and 
who would be invaluable to a General in the field 
from their knowledge of every part of the 
country.2 
The Corps of Guides then, was designed very 
much as a force for use in Canada. 
One of the objectives of the Intelligence 
Department was to make available to officers 
commanding field forces military intelligence 
pertinent to their commands. The Department 
was also charged with gathering information on 
the military resources of the British Empire and 
foreign powers, although efforts and results in 
this regard were meagre. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Denny, Director oflntelligence in 1903, stated in 
a letter to the District Intelligence Officers (DIOs), 
that information on Canada "should be as far 
reaching as possible," and he asked that DIOs 
send in clippings from newspapers and other 
sources on a monthly basis regarding any material 
of a military character, including information on 
the "movements of high USA Officials, troops, etc." 
All data collected would then be collated and 
indexed, and form the basis of the monthly 
Intelligence Diary. 3 
The accumulation of information on the 
military resources of Canada proceeded diligently. 
In 1903 Canada was still very much an unknown 
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and unexplored country, whose military resources 
were often a mystery to military planners in both 
Ottawa and London. The country had not yet been 
fully surveyed. The resource potential, including 
natural resources and regional and local 
manufacturing output, was unknown, and the 
country had yet to be mapped on a scale suitable 
for military use. The Intelligence Department's 
mandate was to correct these shortfalls so that 
military planners would at least know the country 
better than any potential enemies (read USA). It 
was the role of the Corps of Guides to help in the 
collection of this information. As General 
Dundonald stated in 1903: 
Canada is now being covered by a network of 
intelligent and capable men, who will be of great 
service to the country in collecting information 
of a military character and in fitting themselves 
to act as guides in their own [military] districts 
to the forces in the field ... Nobody is admitted 
into this Corps unless he is a man whose services 
are likely to be of real use to the country.• 
In order to systematically gather intelligence 
on Canada's resources, the Guides' organization 
was designed to fit the pre-existing system of 
Military Districts. Each District was given its own 
District Intelligence Officer. The DIO was to 
oversee the entire collection process for the 
district, collect all intelligence reports and maps 
and forward them to the Intelligence Department 
in Ottawa. He was to advise the District 
Commander on intelligence matters, and be able 
to address any question regarding military 
intelligence for his district. 5 "Officers receiving the 
appointment of D. I. 0. should be of suitable spirit 
and one who would take a keen interest in his 
work." A military background was not a 
prerequisite- in fact, civil engineers, and land 
surveyors "or one connected with these 
professions would be preferable." Although those 
selected would also require "a general knowledge 
of military topography and reconnaissance duties, 
and to be acquainted with the geography of his 
District." In addition, it would be helpful if 
potential DIOs knew the "resources of [their] 
district" in terms of"produce, horses, cattle, and 
transportation," so that they could check for 
accuracy the work of those under their 
command.6 
Districts were further subdivided into Sub-
Districts, and commanded by Sub-District 
Intelligence Officers (SDIOs). These officers were 
responsible for commanding the Guides in their 
respective Sub-Districts, collecting Guide reports, 
and gathering information from other sources, 
in addition to their own reconnaissances. They 
were to record all information onto sketch maps 
provided to them for this purpose. If called upon, 
SDIOs were to be able to answer any question of 
an intelligence nature regarding their sub-district, 
just as DIOs and Guides were expected to be able 
to do in their respective jurisdictions. 7 Again, 
military experience was not considered necessary 
for the job. "If an officer can be appointed with 
some knowledge of military topography and 
reconnaissance work, so much the better, but the 
lack of these qualifications will not be counted 
when a man is keen and will take an interest in 
his work." Civil engineers and land surveyors were 
again the first choice. In any event, all those 
selected for the position would preferably have a 
profession or occupation that permitted them to 
travel about their sub-district and the country 
side regularly, to permit some familiarity with the 
residents. 8 
Sub-Districts were divided into Guide Areas 
in which specially qualified men with a knowledge 
of the local area were to be appointed as Guides. 
Guides were to do most of the ground work. They 
were to be intelligent and capable men with a 
thorough knowledge of the topography and 
resources in their respective area. They were 
supposed to be intimately familiar with such 
features as road and rail networks, water routes, 
telegraph and telephone lines, and pathways. As 
well, Guides were expected to be acquainted with 
the farmers and important towns' people in the 
area. If possible, Guides were to have a horse -
indeed, it is difficult to see how they could do 
their job without one. All in all, the standards 
demanded were high: 
Too much stress cannot be laid on the necessity 
for careful selection of Guides. The best class of 
man would be one who is of sufficient position 
and intelligence to be an officer in the Corps, 
but who, not willing to accept an officer's 
responsibility, might join as a Guide. 
The Intelligence Department recognized that this 
class of men would be a rare find and told the 
SDIOs, who were responsible for selecting Guides, 
to do the best they could with the material at hand. 
The pay certainly would not attract good men. 
On the contrary, it was "presumed that those who 
join the Guides will do so from patriotic motives 
89 
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Offtcers of the Canadian Corps of Guides, Cobourg, Ontario, 1906. 
and from interest in a Corps the novelty of which 
cannot fail to appeal to those who desire 
something more than mere "Drill" soldiering. "9 
This point, however, is moot, as the Corps did 
not recruit Guides until 1912. Headquarters felt 
it was best to train officers in their intelligence 
duties before selecting Guides, as Guides were to 
be trained by the Corps' officers. 10 
Before the First World War, the annual Militia 
Reports, on the whole, looked favourably on the 
Corps of Guides. To cite two examples: the Militia 
Report for the year ending 31 December 1905, 
stated that "the duties of this corps are varied, 
and while only organized two years ago, excellent 
and useful work is being done by them in matters 
of surveying and furnishing valuable 
information."11 For the year ending 31 March 
1909, the Militia Report was equally positive. 
"Thanks are due to the officers of the Corps of 
Guides for the willing assistance they rendered 
during the year in collecting and communicating 
intelligence. The reports which they send in are 
always useful, sometimes very valuable. "12 Sir 
John French's 1910 report on the state of the 
Canadian Militia also viewed the Corps of Guides 
in a positive light. "I regard the establishment of 
the Corps of Guides," he wrote, "as being a most 
valuable and useful adjunct to the staff. I think it 
90 
(E.L.M. Burns Collection. NAC PA 113014) 
is a principle which is capable of extension. "13 
Every year more useful military information was 
being gathered, tabulated and distributed in the 
form of an Intelligence Diary to those who could 
use it. 14 And every year more officers were 
becoming proficient in their duties, with the 
Eastern Commands generally performing ahead 
of their counterparts in Western Canada. 15 
In reality there were shortfalls. Training in 
the Corps proceeded sporadically. During 
peacetime the Corps' officers- the DIOs and the 
SDIOs - were scattered all over Canada on 
intelligence gathering duties with little 
opportunity, apart from the annual training 
camps, to meet and train together. It was 
recommended that SDIOs arrange for themselves 
and their Guides to join local rifle clubs to gain 
some musketry practice. The First World War 
quickly proved that much of the limited training 
received was insufficient, and for the wrong war. 
Prewar tactical exercises were reminiscent of Boer 
War methods, and did not anticipate the 
conditions in Flanders. One training camp per 
year was often all the field training the officers in 
the Corps received. These camps were usually 
about 12 days long, and provided training in map 
reading, military topography, equitation, report 
writing, field sketching, and military organization 
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and administration. 16 Guide officers spent most 
of their time at these camps training in practical 
field work instead of drill, as their role in time of 
war would be specialized intelligence work that 
did not require the traditional skills of the other 
arms. 
Rifle shooting, military sketching, 
reconnaissance reports, and a general 
knowledge of the formation and composition of 
our own forces and those of the U.S. are about 
all the principal items which members of the 
Corps should study. There is generally speaking 
no knowledge of actual drill required, though 
every member of the Corps must be able to ride 
[a horse]. 17 
The officers attending training camps were usually 
enthusiastic, but 12 days training could not 
produce an efficient Intelligence Service. 
Officers were also required to pass a series 
of examinations before being fully accepted into 
the Corps. Generally speaking, examinations 
consisted of three written tests, practical field 
work, and equitation. The three written tests were 
each between two and three hours long. One 
examination usually dealt with the duties of 
Intelligence Officers in war and peace. With this 
test officers were examined on their 
understanding of their duties, reconnoitring 
patrols, definitions of military terms, the various 
types of information collected by Intelligence 
Officers, and the means by which it is transmitted 
to headquarters. One of the questions from the 
1911 examination, for instance, was a follows: 
In order to be prepared for war, it is necessary 
to collect and tabulate Intelligence in Peace time. 
Under what main headings may information 
collected in time of peace be said to fall; state 
briefly the sources from which the military 
operations Directorate derives the above 
informat!on?18 
Only one candidate answered this question well, 
according to the examiner's remarks. The 
majority did not understand it, and offered vague 
answers as a result. 
A second written test was concemed with 
military mapping and sketching. Officers were 
expected to demonstrate their level of skill in 
reading contour maps, map making, military 
sketching, and compass work. The 1911 
examination provides another example of a 
question asked. 
Mark on the diagram with a black line what you 
consider to be the shortest route by which you 
could proceed from the point ·A" [marked on 
the map supplied] to the point "B" without being 
seen by a man at the point "D" (the height of the 
man and your own height may be taken as equal 
and omitted from the calculations). 19 
All those taking the test showed "a general idea 
of what is required [in answering this question], 
but the route chosen was by no means the shortest 
- in only one instance was any reason given for 
the route taken." 
The final written examination normally 
focused on organization and administrative 
functions. Candidates were expected to be 
familiar with the organization of the Canadian 
Militia, the Corps of Guides, and have some 
understanding of the organization of US military 
forces. They were also to know which Staff 
Officers were responsible for what duties, in 
addition to other training and administrative 
details.20 
Written examinations were, of course, useful 
as a means for determining where more work and 
study was required. The June and July 
examination of 1907, for example, revealed that 
officers did not seem to know when 
reconnaissance reports were to be written. In fact, 
the test scores on the whole were not as good as 
1906. In 1908 the matter of when to write 
reconnaissance reports had not been cleared up, 
as the question dealing with reconnaissance was 
"Not well answered." Indeed, "It was noticed that 
some officers are not clear as to when 
reconnaissance reports are to be written or the 
methods of carrying out reconnaissance."21 
Obviously one of the most importance 
responsibilities of the Corps of Guides was below 
standard. 
With the practical application test officers 
were examined on their field work abilities. In 
1911, for example, officers were given two hours 
to map three miles of road without instruments, 
and on a scale of three inches to the mile. In 
addition, they were to make notes on the tactical 
features of the ground on both sides of the road 
to a depth of 1,000 yards. 22 This test clearly called 
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for a skilled officer with a trained eye, qualities 
of enormous value in an Intelligence Officer. 
Equitation, of course, tested an officer's 
horsemanship. Any drill that was required would 
follow the cavalry manual. Although "officers will 
not be expected to perfect themselves in details, 
[so) long as they know sufficient to enable them 
to march troops on and off parade for inspectional 
purposes. "23 
British Field manuals were the main source 
to which officers looked to find what skills were 
required. Colonel David Henderson's Art of 
Reconnaissance was also recommended, as was 
his Field Intelligence: Its Principles and 
Practices. Captain C.F. Vander-Boyle's Practical 
Scout Train was on the reading list as well. 
Examinations were based on these and other 
sources. 
Officers without previous military experience 
were appointed to the Guides on a provisional 
basis, and given one year to pass the Corps of 
Guides' examinations, and to obtain a subaltern 
certificate in either one of the cavalry, infantry or 
artillery services. Those with previous militia 
experience also had to pass all examinations, and 
bear a certification of rank in one of the three 
arms. Officers with two years' experience in the 
regular army, or the Canadian or some other 
Dominion's permanent force, had only to pass 
the third examination- equitation- unless his 
previous experience was in a mounted service.24 
Reconnaissance rides were also used in 
training. Once a year some of the Corps' officers 
would take ten to 12 days and ride from one 
predetermined location to another and make 
notes, maps and sketches on everything of a 
military nature. In 1909, for instance, one troop 
of officers left Kingston and rode to Petawawa. 
Included in their kit was a prismatic compass, 
protractor, note book, field glasses, and sketching 
materials. Their job was to take notes and make 
sketches on the condition of roads, railways, 
water routes and so forth, so as to practice their 
mapping and intelligence gathering skills. 25 
Officers of the Canadian Corps of Guides, Niagara-on-the-Lake. Captain Lawrence H. Sitwell is at the 
extreme left. (Lawrence Hurt Sitwell Collection, NAC PA 111891) 
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Lectures given at local armouries presented 
another avenue for Guide officers to hone their 
trade. For example, Captain Lawrence Sitwell gave 
a lecture in March 1909 entitled "A Scout is born 
-not made, but much that is lacking in birth may 
be made up for by careful training." In it he 
outlined his views of what a Scout's duties 
entailed, and offered suggestions on how to 
sharpen one's scouting acumen. "A Scouts [sic] 
duties render it almost imperative," he wrote, 
"that he be imbued with sporting instincts; he 
must understand nature in its fullest sense, 
natural history, birds, wild animals and insects." 
It is the Scout's duty to "see without being seen." 
He told his audience that if they could outwit "an 
ordinary wild bird or animal" that they were "on 
the first rung of the ladder of success as a Scout," 
for outwitting nature is no easy feat. He believed 
that Scouts required special training to perform 
their tasks, especially in night-time operations. 
Sitwell asked his listeners to practice constantly 
their tracking and observation skills, and offered 
practical advice on how to perfect these skills. 
Scouts, he said, should learn the sounds of nature 
at rest so that when on outpost duty they would 
recognize changes. "Throw a stone into a Swamp 
and the croaking instantly ceases. It is by means 
of sounds like these ... that enables a scout or a 
man on outpost duty ... to tell whether his point or 
flank is in a state of rest and quiet and that no 
movement of the enemy is taking place in his 
immediate neighbourhood." Scouts, he said, 
could practice their art when off duty. When 
walking follow animal tracks, he suggested, to 
improve one's tracking abilities. Those who live 
in cities could practice their observation skills 
by noting, while walking along the street, what 
they see in shop windows. He offered easy 
methods to determine direction without a 
compass, and to gauge distances with the naked 
eye. He pointed out that distant sounds could be 
more readily heard if one placed his ear close to 
the ground. To hear even farther a Scout should 
immerse himself in water, such as a still lake, 
pond or river, as sounds travel farther in that 
medium. Good Scouts, he offered, should be 
willing to make such sacrillces. Moreover, Scouts, 
he explained, should also be able to read a map, 
although he felt that "As far as our Canadian 
Militia is concerned I regret to have to state that 
at least 75% of the Officers if given a map would 
not understand it any more than a lumber jack 
understands Greek." Scouts should possess all 
five senses plus the sixth sense "called common 
sense or horsesense." He further stated that 
Scouts "should understand something about 
Signalling. "26 Later that year Sitwell was again 
lecturing, but this time on military mapping and 
sketching. He was probably heeding his own 
words, and was attempting to improve the 
performance of the 75 per cent of officers whom 
he felt could not read a map. 
Guide officers also polished their skills at 
annual Corps of Guide Conferences. These 
gatherings not only offered an opportunity to 
socialize with fellow officers, but a chance to hear 
various presentations by one's peers on 
Intelligence related matters. At the third annual 
conference held in 1909, for instance, topics 
discussed included "The Detroit River Tunnel," 
byMajorH.J. Lamb, DIO for Military District#!. 
Captain R.R. Barber, of the Corps of Guides, 
explained "A system of indexing, recording, and 
transmitting information." Major-General Lake 
talked about "Reconnaissance in front of an 
Army," while Colonel Sam Hughes outlined his 
ideas on "The Guide, an asset in Peace and in 
War." Attending officers, of course, could take 
what they wanted from these conferences, but the 
opportunity was there to make connections for 
furthering their careers, and to learn more about 
their duties as Guide officers.27 
In 1912, the Challenge Cup was introduced 
to test the Corps' efficiency. The challenge was 
largely one of equitation and compass work. 
However, the Challenge Cup was as much a social 
event as a test. Officers who asked to participate 
in this cross-country horse race paid a five dollar 
entry fee for the privilege of being judged on their 
speed, jumping ability, pace, and the condition of 
their horse at the race's end. Competitors were 
allowed a map, compass and a watch with which 
to complete the 15 mile race with its six to ten 
jumps. Horses with spur marks were 
automatically disqualified, as were horses that 
did not eat half a feed of oats within one hour of 
completing the race. 28 Intelligence skills called for 
in the First World War were obviously lacking in 
this challenge. Indeed, intelligence skills in general 
were neither strenuously tested nor 
demonstrated. 
Training in the Corps was severely 
handicapped by the fact that until 1912 it 
contained no Guides. The Corps of Guides was 
largely a Corps of officers. There were Guides 
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listed as present at annual camps before this date, 
but in reality they were the officers' grooms and 
batmen, not Guides. 29 During the first years of 
the Corps' existence, the officer commanding the 
Corps believed that one Guide per township was 
plenty during wartime, and should be restricted 
to "the least possible number" during peace. 
It cannot be impressed too firmly on all officers 
that Intelligence work. .. will form the chief and 
main work of the Corps for some years. It will 
be absolutely impossible and unnecessary even 
to form companies of guides; the object of the 
Corps is lost in formations of this kind. 30 
In this case, the least possible number equalled 
zero. Nevertheless, when the time came every 
Guide - although none were being trained -was 
expected to "be able to think for and look after 
himself and his horse, and be dependent on no 
one, but rather seek that others should be 
dependent on him"31 
By 1907 there were calls to reverse this 
situation. Major E.T.P. Shewen, of the Corps of 
Guides based in New Brunswick, explained his 
position forcefully in a letter to headquarters 
requesting 32 Guides. 
I am very much in earnest about this matter. We 
have long been held up to ridicule, as being a 
regiment of officers without men. I can assure 
you, speaking as a civil engineer, it is impossible 
to do without men if you want to get any work 
accomplished. 
He further went on to say: 
It is absurd to suppose that five officers, in a 
military district comprehending 28,000 square 
miles, could, in time of war, conduct an effective, 
local. intelligence service, that is to say, one that 
could furnish information of an enemy's 
approach, open or disguised, by sea or land. It 
would be equally unreasonable to assume that 
In event of a crisis, men, picked up at a moment's 
notice, would prove efficient scouts ... or would 
be able to satisfactorily perform the important 
duty of keeping a look-out, exercising judgment 
and giving notice, by wire, to the nearest officer 
commanding, if occasion required. 32 
Finally, in 1912 a company of mounted 
Guides was organized and trained. This gave 
officers of the Corps their first real opportunity 
to command a body of troops designed for 
battlefield intelligence work. The training of 
Guides at the annual camps followed the same 
94 
or similar syllabus as that offered to officers. The 
training syllabus for the 1912 camp at Calgary 
offers an example. Day one dealt largely with horse 
care. Day two focused on map work, conventional 
signs and the use of simple scales. On the third 
day the officers and men of the Corps worked in 
the field and received specific instruction on how 
to report on such features as roads, railways, 
farms and villages, rivers and enemy positions. 
The fourth day saw the Guides practising their 
message writing skills, comparing maps to 
ground, tracking and making deductions. The 
fifth day was a repeat of day three, while the sixth 
day concentrated on reconnoitring an enemy 
position. Patrol work and the transmission of 
messages made up the seventh day's schedule, 
while the eighth day was set aside for musketry. 
On day nine the men practised reconnoitring an 
enemy outpost line "by day with a View to a nearer 
approach by night." Day ten was used to repeat 
some of the exercises practised earlier. Days 
eleven and twelve were for use as the camp 
commandant may direct. It was assumed that all 
ranks were already proficient riders, so there was 
no instruction in equitation. So as not to waste 
any time, scouting formations would be practised 
as the Guides rode in and out of camp on their 
way to and from field training. The objective of 
the camp training was to "provide a body of 
Officers and men who are skilled in reading a 
map and who know what to report and how to 
report it, either verbally or in writing. "33 
One district did, however, experiment with 
Guide officers commanding Scouts before 1912. 
During the ThanksgiVing weekend camp in 1911, 
Major C.H. Mitchell, the DIO for the Second 
DiVisional Area, took part in a tactical exercise in 
which Scouts, commanded by Corps of Guide 
officers, were employed. 34 The positive 
experiences of this camp contributed to the 
creation of a company of mounted Guides the 
following year. Several lessons were learned at 
this camp about the employment and training of 
Scouts. It was clear to Mitchell that the time had 
come to train an independent body of Scouts 
under the Corps' command, as the attitudes and 
skill level of some of the men detailed to act as 
Scouts from the other serVices were inadequate. 
It seemed that commanding officers were 
unwilling to part with their best men by handing 
them over to Guide officers. It was also apparent 
that scouting was specialized work, requiring 
specific training not available in the other arms. 
7
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Major A.J. Van Nostrand (left) and Captain C.H. Mitchell, Stanley Barracks, Toronto, Ontario, January 1911. 
(Lawrence Hurt Sitwell Collection. NAC PA 111942) 
From his experience at this camp, Mitchell also 
realized that the transmission of messages called 
for some improvement, as important information 
sometimes took longer to reach headquarters 
than was desired. Intelligence and 
communications work go hand-in-hand, and 
information would have come in faster, Mitchell 
thought, if the cavalry had had a visual signalling 
system, a field telephone, and a motorcycle. This 
would also save valuable horse flesh. Mitchell's 
concerns presaged the Canadian Corps' 
experience during the First World War, where 
communications and specialized scouting skills 
were also of premium value. 35 
Other Districts were not as innovative, and 
performed below expected standards. For 
example, an inspection of Military District #10, 
in 1912, revealed that the District Intelligence 
Officer had made no compilation of military 
intelligence and statistics. Many maps, though, 
had been gathered, "but none of a strictly military 
character." The sub-districts were also ill defined 
and liable to cause confusion, and there was a 
considerable shortage of equipment. 36 
By 1912, even the normally positive Militia 
Reports hinted at imperfections in the Corps. 
There was a warning about the importance of 
selecting high quality officers for the Corps, for 
"in no other branch does "dead wood" so 
materially mar efficiency as in the Corps of 
Guides." On the other hand, the Militia Report 
also stated that officers, "with very few 
exceptions," were aware of the "importance and 
highly technical cast of their duties." There were 
also hints that some ill-feeling towards the Corps 
was brewing in the other services. "Hitherto," the 
Report reads, "in the eyes of many, little or no 
thought has been given to [the Corps'] value and 
responsibilities, consequently [the Corps] has 
been looked upon as a comfortable refuge for such 
as desired rank and uniform without the 
attending sacrifices. "37 The Militia Report for the 
95 
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year ending 31 March 1913 pointed out that 
"Adequate accommodation [was] wanting for such 
officers as are specially charged with the care and 
compilation of maps and records." Furthermore, 
it expressed regret that Royal Military College 
graduates who joined the Corps tended to "evade 
their obligation as to training, and for this reason 
a doubt is created as to whether such a desirable 
source can be counted upon to fill vacancies." 
There was also difficulty in procuring horses.38 
Moreover, as late as 1913, ten years after the 
Corps was organized and only one year before 
the First World War, there was still some confusion 
over the organization and battlefield role the 
Guides were to play. The Corps was viewed by 
many as a "hybrid" of the three standard services, 
without any clear function. This, according to 
George Paley, the officer administering the Corps 
of Guides in 1913, was understandable as the 
Corps did not fit into the "stereotyped 
organizations with which [commanders] are 
familiar." As it was not until 1912 that Guides 
were organized into mounted companies "no clear 
ideas ever appear to have been expressed as to 
the exact organization, training and employment 
in war of the rank and file." The Corps' role was 
so misunderstood that Lieutenant-Colonel Paley 
felt he had to explain its role in a letter to the 
commanding officer of the First Divisional Area. 
During wartime, if operating as Divisional 
mounted troops: 
the Guides could be of service in the opening of 
a campaign in patrolling, scouting, and despatch 
riding, whilst, from their local knowledge, they 
would come in particularly useful for any 
independent reconnaissance. 
If nothing else, they could act "as expert despatch 
riders and for intercommunication purposes ... a 
service the want of which is apparent in every 
campaign." Paley also thought that the Guides 
would probably "prove of value in making rough 
sketches and plans required by the Staff, and in 
providing Intelligence Police," and in gathering 
"information under cover of the protection 
afforded by the troopers, especially so at first 
before the cavalry had developed much expertness 
in the art of scouting." As well, Guides could be 
used to watch all friendly lines of approach and 
give early warning of attack. Mter all was said 
and done, however, what Paley described sounded 
very much like a force of independent, well trained 
traditional cavalry, and it would be interesting to 
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learn if his letter cleared up the situation to any 
great degree. Paley also explained something of 
the proposed organization of the Corps in 
wartime. The Staff Manual (War), he noted, 
expected the Corps of Guides to form part of the 
Intelligence Corps under the Commander-in-
Chief. In this capacity Guide officers could be 
assigned "multifarious appointments in 
connection with Intelligence and Censorship." 
However, there was a: 
tendency on the part of some members of the 
Corps to think that officers intended for these 
appointments, will derive little benefit from the 
nature of the training at camp, and that they 
should therefore be excused. This is very 
erroneous ... [Such a position] would be to 
acknowledge that any civilian of good standing 
in his business or private profession would be 
equally suited, and consequently one of the 
strongest arguments for the maintenance of the 
Corps of Guides would be removed. 39 
Nonetheless, there were some shining lights 
in the Corps. One example was Major C.H. 
Mitchell, DIO for District Two. During the Great 
War, he would hold in turn the position of General 
Staff Officer for Intelligence in the First Canadian 
Division, the Canadian Corps, the Second Army 
of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and 
later, the BEF forces in Italy. In 1911, while still a 
captain, he wrote a report entitled "Aerial 
Navigation in Warfare." In it he recognized the 
important role that aircraft would play in any 
future war, and proceeded to describe the type of 
craft available to contemporary armies, including 
captive balloons, dirigibles and heavier-than-air 
ships. He was somewhat futuristic and Orwellian 
though, when he declared that 
There is no doubt that very shortly a vertical 
lifting "heavier than air" machine will be brought 
out capable of standing stationary or hovering 
over any point; this will probably combine the 
horizontal speed properties of the aeroplane. 
He saw in the airplane not only intelligence 
capabilities such as reconnaissance, but a 
screening role whereby enemy planes could be 
blocked from viewing friendly forces. Aircraft, he 
recognized, would also be valuable in a signalling 
and communication role, in directing artillery frre, 
strategic bombing, antisubmarine warfare, and 
in general land and sea co-operation. He further 
saw the airplane as a natural adjunct to the Corps 
of Guides, providing a service that Intelligence 
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Officers "must early become proficient" with. 40 In 
1912, after having been promoted to major, he 
composed a paper titled "Intelligence service in 
relation to Army Service Corps. His 
understanding of intelligence as described in this 
report would hold true throughout the First World 
War. "It goes without saying," he wrote, 
that the better intelligence obtained beforehand 
regarding an enemy's country, his resources and 
his transportation facilities, as well as of our 
own country, the more positively and 
consequently the more safely can a plan of 
operation be conceived and carried out. The 
failure to obtain early information of this nature 
was especially apparent in the case of our own 
South African War and on the part of the French 
in 1870.41 
During the First World War he tried not to make 
the same mistake. Mitchell also stressed the need 
for co-operation among the various services in 
order for Intelligence to provide the best possible 
service. This was an attitude he maintained 
throughout the war. Mitchell also laid the 
groundwork for the Canadian Corps' Intelligence 
Service. As such, he can take much of the credit 
for its organizational, administrative, and 
battlefield success. His achievement in the 
Intelligence Corps during the war attests to his 
efficiency. 
Prior to the war Ottawa periodically 
forwarded intelligence gathered on Canada's 
military resources to the Colonial Office for use 
by the Committee of Imperial Defence. This 
surrender of national secrets and military 
intelligence clearly demonstrates Canada's 
colonial status in relation to Great Britain at the 
time. No independent nation would countenance 
such actions. The forwarding of intelligence to 
Great Britain also suggests that Canada would 
not, and could not stand aside if the Empire went 
to war. In fact, the Militia Report for the year 
ending 31 March 1908, is even more pointed in 
this regard. 
Special efforts were made to ascertain the 
manufacturing capabilities of Canada in respect 
to those articles which would be required for 
the use and up-keep of an army in the field, not 
only for the purposes of the Dominion, but with 
a view to acquainting the Imperial authorities 
with the material resources upon which the 
Empire might reckon in the event of a great 
war (emphasis added). 42 
When war was declared in August 1914 the 
Corps of Guides was not called up to serve 
overseas. At least 235 of the 499 members of the 
Corps did, however, volunteer for the first 
Canadian Contingent; while in British Columbia 
various units in Military District #11 were placed 
on active service to guard the coast, including the 
11th Detachment of the Corps of Guides. This 
was "the only Guides unit formally placed on 
active service in 1914."43 The British Army, to 
which the Canadian Contingent conformed, did 
not have on establishment a Guide organization. 
As a result, the men of the Canadian Corps of 
Guides were distributed throughout the 
Contingent in various staff and specialist 
functions, some as Intelligence Officers. However 
rudimentary their Guide training may have been 
before the war, it was still more than the prewar 
British Army offered its troops. The regular 
British Army was largely without any trained field 
Intelligence Officers in August 1914, and sent 
untrained men to meet the Germans. Although 
the men of the Corps of Guides had, in some ways, 
trained for the wrong war, many of the intelligence 
skills they possessed were transferable to the mud 
of Flanders, and proved a valuable contribution 
to the Canadian Corps. The very existence of the 
Corps of Guides kept the importance ofbattlefield 
intelligence before the eyes of Canadian soldiers 
in the years prior to the war, and probably goes a 
fair way in explaining why Canadian formations 
tended to employ more Staff Officers on 
Intelligence duties than did their British 
equivalents. 44 And as combat intelligence was 
crucial to success in the First World War, it is 
probably fair to say that the Corps of Guides 
contributed to the success of the Canadian Corps. 
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Announcement 
A militaria collectors group devoted to the insignia of 
peace-keeping missions has been formed. The Peace 
Keeping Insignia Collectors Group (PKICG) was 
created 21 November I995 and now has members from 
Canada, Denmark and the USA. 
The focus of this organization is the preservation of items 
of militaria worn by the troops participating in peace-
keeping missions. This includes the mission insignta, 
eg: the standard United Nations arm patch or the NATO 
"IFOR" patch, the national insignia of each contingent 
and mission-unique items such as metal pocket badges, 
flags, T -shirts and other items that are produced. 
Subsidiary aims include preserving these items for the 
military history of each participating country and to 
further the understanding of peace-keeping to the 
citizens of the world through displays and presentations. 
For more information, please contact: 
Douglas Townend 
1 758 Harvest Crescent 
Orleans, Ontario, Canada KIC I V4 
Phone(613)837-1916 
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